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Lesson 9
Approaches to
Multi-Stakeholder Coordination

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
- Identify at least three sectors where civil-military-police coordination may be relevant
- Identify at least three reasons why coordination is necessary
- Identify at least three similarities and distinctions between civil society and security forces
- Recognise the differences between coexistence, coordination, and cooperation
- Recognise the types of information security forces can share with civil society and vice versa
- Identify at least three different types of civil-military-police coordination forums
- Identify at least three steps to prepare for civil-military-police coordination

This lesson provides civilian, military and police leaders with guidance about how they can coordinate to better support human security. It describes the purpose of coordination, different forms of coordination, and necessary steps to support civil-military-police coordination.

1. Multi-stakeholder coordination is necessary.

No one group can achieve human security on their own. Individuals and groups affected by insecurity have a "stake" in human security and are "stakeholders." Different stakeholders need to coordinate with each other through joint processes that enable them to work together. Civil society, civilian government, military and police are key stakeholders that need to coordinate to support human security. Coordination improves coherence and effectiveness. Multi-stakeholder coordination is necessary for sevaral reasons.

- No single organisation can address all the complex tasks of supporting peace and human security in a complex environment. Many different types of organisations (including military, police, and civil society) are necessary to address diverse challenges.

- All stakeholders working in the same complex environment need a basic awareness of who else is working in the same space in order to do the following:
    - Avoid duplication of effort or unintentional harm to other groups

o Communicate with each other on shared goals
o Use resources more efficiently
o Enable other stakeholders to add value
o Achieve better outcomes through timely action
o Identify appropriate complementary roles for different stakeholders

2. **Military, police and civil society are increasingly working in the same complex environments to address the same challenges.**

This *Handbook* covers many of the challenges that require diverse stakeholders to work together. These include:

- Conflict assessment
- Civilian assistance
  o Humanitarian assistance (such as emergency food, water, and housing)
  o Development assistance (such as building schools and health clinics)
  o Governance (such as supporting rule of law and participatory decision making)
  o Healthcare
  o Education
  o Water management
- Demining and mining action
- Election monitoring
- Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR)
- Security and justice sector reform (SSR and JSSR)
- Dialogue, negotiation, and mediation between groups to promote reconciliation

3. **Coordination avoids potential unintended impacts**

At minimum, better coordination could prevent unintended consequences harmful to other stakeholders' interests.

- De-conflict activities to ensure that each group's goals and activities do not undermine other groups. For example, if a military is building a school in a community using military personnel, this may undermine a civilian organisation's efforts to do community-based development with community volunteers and local ownership of school-building and other activities.
- Determine how to maintain a distinction between civilians and combatants, and preserve the autonomy and independence necessary for all stakeholders. This is necessary since in some contexts, non-state armed groups may view civilian organisations as soft targets, easier to attack than security forces. If civilians are cooperating with military or police, they may be seen as symbolic extensions of the security sector and may be wrongly perceived as legitimate targets.

4. **Coordination builds on common ground.**

Civilian government and civil society organisations are both similar to and distinct from military and police forces. Recognising differences as well as shared interests and principles can help all groups working in the same space to improve awareness of each other. Individuals working within civilian organisations, military or police may be motivated by a similar desire for service to others, make personal sacrifices, take risks, and share a sense of professionalism and commitment. The illustration below includes some of the common characteristics of people who work in complex environments.

5. **Recognising differences is important to coordination.**

There are significant internal differences between different types of military or police forces in different cities and countries. There are also vast differences on how civilians in government work and how different civil society organisations work. Yet there are broad general differences between civilian and security sector organisations that are worth mentioning, as they pose challenges to coordination. They have different terminology, different missions and distinct organisational cultures, strategic narratives, and operational requirements.


Figure 18: Shared Characteristics

	Civilians	Security Sector
Terminology	Civilian terminology on civilian activities	Military and/or police terminology on security activities
Organisational Culture	Less structured, less formal	More structured, more formal
Assessment & Planning	Participatory research with local communities; shared analysis	Often classified intelligence and internal analysis
Goals and Objectives	Human security	National security with less emphasis on human security for citizens or civilians in other countries
Theories of Change/Strategic Narrative	Based mostly on social science	Based mostly on military science, though increasing interest in the "human aspects of operational environments"
Operational Requirements for Coordination	Independence, Empowerment, Distinction, Freedom, Access (see Lesson 7)	Coordination should be comprehensive and integrated (see definitions below)

Figure 19: Differences between Civilians and the Security Forces

6. Civil-military-police cooperation, coordination, and coexistence are distinct.

- Cooperation is a term refering to stakeholders with overlapping but distinct missions identifying specific objectives where they can assist each other. For example, after the earthquake in Haiti, stakeholders cooperated in emergency humanitarian assistance. "Cooperation" represents civilian organisations and security forces actively working together to achieve shared goals. Cooperation is more likely in peace-time. In peaceful contexts, civil society may coordinate with military and police to improve their human security efforts.

- Coordination is a term meaning basic communication to share information and avoid duplication or conflict with other stakeholders. For example, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coordinates the work of humanitarian NGOs and military forces in disaster relief and complex emergencies. The term "coordination" is used as an umbrella term for any type of communication exchange between security forces and all types of civilian agencies (UN, governmental and CSOs). Coordination is more likely where security forces' mandate includes support for humanitarian assistance or to work with civilians to support broader human security goals. The political context and the mission of security forces impact the level of civil-military-police interaction.

- Coexistence is a term that means operating in the same space without interfering in the other stakeholder's activities and with minimal communication. For example, in Iraq, most NGOs took a stance of coexistence with foreign military forces because any perceived relationship seemed to correlate with the levels of violence against their staff and beneficiaries. "Coexistence" is at one end of the spectrum representing civilian organisations and security forces interacting at the most minimal level. Coexistence is more likely where security forces take sides in an armed conflict and are primarily engaged in enemy-centric approaches to security, with little emphasis on protection of civilians or other population-centric approaches. In the worst-case scenario, civil society groups, particularly humanitarian agencies, may curtail their presence if it is impossible for them to access affected populations without risking the security for their staff and communities in need.

There may also be other motivations or constraints that influence civil-military-police interaction. Some military forces reward military leaders for their achievements in civil-military coordination and cooperation. While coordination may allow agencies to achieve the overall mission, it may decrease the recognition of individual contributions made by distinct agencies. Competition among agencies for funding creates disincentives for coordination with others. Organisations want to be able to take credit for successes, and coordination may be seen as decreasing their ownership of success. Agencies are funded by their measurable programme outputs (short-term) and not for their programme impacts (long-term). Yet impacts are naturally a result of the sum of many agencies working together, thus making a causal effect impossible to determine precisely.[34]

7. Civil-Military-Police Information Sharing

Sharing information is the most minimal form of coordination, as detailed in the next lesson. From a human security point of view, the purpose of information sharing between security forces and civil society (both individual civilians and civil society organisations) should always and only be to support human security. All stakeholders should share information to support efforts aimed at the protection of civilians and civilian assistance.

Civil society may look to military or police forces to share information about basic area security to help determine their programming. However, on the military side, the internal organisational clearance to provide information to civil society is a challenge. Many CSOs attempt to be transparent about their programmes but prefer not to share all the information about their programmes, particularly information that may be used for intelligence gathering or targeting attacks.

Civilians outside of government should never be asked to share information that would enable others to identify and kill a target or that would make civilians themselves more of a target for armed groups. Armed groups frequently accuse NGOs of collecting intelligence, and the increase in political attacks against NGOs may be related to the assumptions that they exchange information about the locations of non-state armed groups with military and police. For this reason, many civil society groups are resistant to all forms of information sharing and coordination as a basic matter of their staff security and the safety of their beneficiaries. For example, many NGOs balance their commitment to transparency and accountability to local populations with the principle that they should never share information that may endanger human lives or compromise their impartiality and neutrality.

The most basic forms of information sharing between civilians, military, and police relate to the following issues: [35]

- Security information: Information that may affect the security of civilians and/or aid workers should be shared with appropriate entities.
- Locations of aid workers and facilities: Information on the location of humanitarian staff and facilities that are operating where there is a military presence.
- Civil society activities: Information on civil society activities, especially humanitarian plans, routes, timing of convoys and airlifts in order to coordinate planned operations and avoid accidental military strikes in an area where civil society organisations are operating.
- Mine-action activities: Information relevant to mine action.
- Population movements: Information on major movements of civilians.
- Military Civilian Assistance: Information on relief efforts undertaken by the military.
- Post-strike information: Information on military strike locations and explosive munitions used during military campaigns to assist the prioritisation and planning of humanitarian assistance and mine-action activities.

8. Five Areas for Coordination of Human Security

In addition to basic information sharing, there are five main areas for civil-military-coordination for human security. The next lesson details these five areas that form a "Coordination Wheel."

- Joint capacity building
- Jointly identify human security challenges:
- Jointly designing human security strategies
- Jointly implement human security strategies
- Jointly monitor and evaluate impact

Ideally civil society and the security coordinate with each other in each of these activities. The coordination wheel of activities produces a vision for what local ownership looks like at its most robust.

Figure 20: Coordination Wheel for Human Security

9. Mapping Potential Civil-Military-Police Relationships

The chart below maps varied levels of relationship between diverse types of stakeholders.[36] Coordination mechanisms will vary depending on the type of civilians and the type of military involved.

The following table illustrates a more complex matrix of relationships
- Within an agency or 'intra-agency' such as the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) peacekeepers coordinating with DPKO civil affairs staff),
- At a 'whole of government' level such as a government's military coordinating with its development agencies
- Between agencies such as DPKO peacekeepers coordinating with UN Development Programme (UNDP) or the European Union relating to NATO
- At the external-internal level such as DPKO peacekeepers coordinating with a country's National Development Plan or a foreign military coordinating with a local NGO.

In general, the levels of consistency and coherence are greater in the darker shaded areas. There is more conflict between the goals of different stakeholders in the lighter shaded areas, as relationships become competitive.[37]

	Intra-Agency	Whole of Government	Inter-State or International	External-Internal
Stakeholder are united, under one command				
Stakeholders are integrated				
Stakeholders cooperate				
Stakeholders Coordinate				
Stakeholder Coexist				
Stakeholder Compete				

Figure 21: Adapted from the Comprehensive Approach Matrix that compares levels of coherence and types of relationships (see citation de Coning and Friis, 2011).

10. UN, NATO, and Government Approaches to Coordination
The UN, NATO, and some governments use the following terminology to refer to their civil-military-police coordination goals and approaches.

- Unity of Command is a term describing a single commanding authority who makes decisions that others implement.

- Unity of Effort is a term refering to multiple organisations working toward the same objective, but under different command or decisionmaking structures. Ideally, military forces would like to have a "unity of effort" with civilian organisations that are not under their command.

- Integration is a term refering to stakeholders conducting joint assessment, planning, and monitoring and evaluation with each other, while implementing the actual programme activities separately. The UN has taken several steps toward civil-military integration, including the establishment of the Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) and an Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), an Integrated Assessment and Planning Policy (IAP) and an IAP *Handbook* to ensure coherency in the UN system and relevant external partners.

- Comprehensive Approach refers to the coordination between different stakeholders. There are different interpretations of the concept of the "comprehensive approach." Some interpret it to mean that civilian and the security sector are brought together under one command structure. Others understand the "comprehensive approach" as a set of communication and coordination mechanisms on more neutral ground, without a command and control structure and allowing civilians to maintain an independent status.

11. Military-based Coordination Structures
The UN, NATO and intervening states use different terminology for their civil-military coordination structures. These terms refer to military-based coordination structures that attempt to coordinate with civilian agencies (UN, governmental, and civil society organisations).

- Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) is a NATO concept for efforts to foster coordination and cooperation between military and civilians.

- Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is a military concept. It is defined in different ways by different countries and organisations. For example:

    o NATO CIMIC refers to the coordination and cooperation, in support of a mission, between Alliance forces and the civil environment (both governmental and non-governmental civilian groups).

    o UN CIMIC refers to the interface between the military component of a UN peace operation and the political, humanitarian, developmental, human rights, and rule-of-law components of the mission, as well as many other external partners in the larger peacebuilding system.

Some countries like the US establish Civil-Military Operation Centers (CMOC) for coordinating civil-military operations in an area of operations. The CMOC usually serves as a meeting place for military and non-military entities involved in governance, stabilisation, humanitarian relief, and reconstruction activities or for interaction between the entities involved in these activities and the civilian population.

12. Civil Society Approaches to Coordination

Many civil society organisations (CSOs) oppose or distance themselves from civil-military integration, the comprehensive approach or CIMIC. Some CSOs believe these approaches are contradictory to the Geneva Conventions' call for a clear distinction between civilians and combatants. They argue the "technical" focus on joint planning and operations is a conceptual jump over the fundamental differences in goals and values held by different military and civilian agencies.

Yet civil society shares the conviction that coordination and communication mechanisms are essential when there are diverse stakeholders working in the same environment. Acceptable terminology and mechanisms for coordination include the following:

- Humanitarian civil-military coordination is more established and institutionalised than any other form of civil-military-police coordination. The UN defines humanitarian civil-military coordination as "*the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimise inconsistency, and when appropriate, pursue common goals.*" UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCOORD) establishes coordination centres to achieve strictly humanitarian goals.[38] Module 5 on Coordination on Civilian Assistance provides more details on this topic.

- Whole of Society refers to the need for diverse stakeholders at all levels of society to work together, as no one stakeholder can solve all of the problems in a complex environment and all must contribute according to their roles and responsibilities.

- Multi-Stakeholder Coordination is a term to describe meetings or mechanisms that facilitate dialogue between diverse groups.

- Coordination by Sector describes how organisations working on the same "sector" (such as Rule of Law, Gender, or Reconciliation) can coordinate their work.

- Infrastructures for Peace refers to agreements and platforms developed between governments, security forces, and civil society to coordinate their efforts to prevent, manage and transform violent conflict. With the support of the UN, civil society has helped to create "infrastructures for peace," also known as "National Peace Councils" in Kenya, Ghana and elsewhere. These written agreements between government, security forces, and civil society outline the specific roles and responsibilities and coordination mechanisms.

The next lesson goes into more detail about the link between these coordination structures and the broader concept of local ownership and civilian oversight. Each of these terms refers to a similar principle that "local" people who are affected by security challenges need to be involved. Governments, security forces and civil society can coordinate their efforts to engage local communities. Or these groups can

create forums to broaden and deepen local "ownership" in security strategies and "oversight" of the security sector.

13. Local Perspectives on Civil-Military Coordination

Most civil-military-police coordination takes place among international NGOs with international security forces. National governments, security forces and donors often assume there is "no local capacity." In reality, there are often local civil society groups that work to prevent conflict and support human security. In particular, there is a false assumption that local civil society lacks capacity to address security issues. There are local civil society organisations in every context. Over the last thirty years, civil society groups have built their capacity in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. In many countries, there are more people in civil society with advanced graduate degrees and years of experience using mediation and reconciliation skills than there are in government. Local civil society's expertise in human security is a critical asset.

In most situations, only a portion of civil society personnel belongs to NGOs who wear logos on their vehicles or clothing. Security forces will only be able to identify those with logos, or those whom they meet in coordination forums. While military forces and international humanitarian organisations may establish some sort of communication platform for information sharing, smaller organisations or informal local humanitarian responders may be left out of the coordination forums.

Local civil society emphasises the need to first and foremost coordinate among internal stakeholders – the national government, national security forces and local civil society. These groups may be in conflict over how to prioritise security challenges or interests. Most countries lack forums for national dialogue or coordination to identify shared goals.

Even if information is shared, military forces can never assume they have all the information on civil society. Small, local CSOs may not know how to contact military forces and inform them about their presence. Coordination mechanisms between national and international military forces and local civil society group are largely absent. External interveners often do not have an adequate stakeholder map or skill set to understand how to identify diverse local voices inside and outside of the national government.

External interveners are usually accountable to their home offices headquartered in their country of origin without direct accountability to local populations or local governments. Furthermore, external interveners often wrongly assume they know what is best for local people and base their assistance programmes on theories of change learned in other countries. External assistance may even "undermine or destroy the capacity that exists in a society and replace it with a weak and dysfunctional new capacity."[39] External interveners are often oblivious to local perceptions of their legitimacy or presence in the country. While outsiders tend to see themselves as benevolent or even making sacrifices to help local populations, insiders are often suspicious of the motivations of these interveners operating in their country, assuming they are working on behalf of foreign national interests and intelligence gathering rather than truly assisting and respecting the local context.

Coordinating *external* military and civilian actors with those *inside* of the host country is difficult for several reasons. In integrated UN missions and whole of government interventions, civilians and military may also be so busy coordinating with themselves that they may exclude others and overlook internal stakeholders. Emphasis on external cohesion among foreign agencies may undermine coherence with internal stakeholders, including the national government, national security forces. Local civil society is often the last on the list of coordination priorities. Yet in reality, they may the most important stakeholders for building sustainable human security.

14. Ad-Hoc Coordination

In the absence of adequate formal mechanisms, civil-military-police coordination may happen informally through *ad hoc* meetings at restaurants or other sites. Where there is no coordinating body, groups may coordinate informally when working in the same area as individual people build relationships in informal settings. In some situations, military, police and civilian actors meet informally driven by the personality of their leaders and individual relationship building and trust building.

Military forces observed a Toyota pickup truck following the same route every day. They stopped the truck at a checkpoint, suspecting armed gunmen. Instead they found a family operating a makeshift ambulance to take people to the closest medical facility in the provincial capital. The military learned that local humanitarian efforts exist without a formal NGO logo or status.

Informal coordination is better than no coordination. However, ad hoc coordination can leave out important stakeholders. Although it may be impossible to include all stakeholder groups in any type of coordination meetings, a stronger effort should be made to find out who else is working in the same complex environment.

During military operations in armed hostilities, it can be dangerous for any type of civilians to meet with military personnel. Sometimes a meetinghouse is set up outside of a military perimeter. But often civil society staff are not able to safely travel to a neutral location or no neutral location exists. Given the security risks that in-person meetings with military staff may pose to CSOs, phone or email are often the most effective means of communication. In some contexts where civilian actors may want to avoid direct communication with security forces altogether, the use of social media could also be an unofficial way to share information, as a proxy platform without direct contact among the participants. Any of these more indirect mechanisms will enable civilian actors to maintain independence.

15. Preparatory Coordination Tasks

Effective coordination requires preparation. Here is a list of key tasks that all stakeholders should undertake before entering their first common meeting:

<u>Before a Crisis:</u>
- Create organisational incentives for coordination
  - -Mandate the requirement for staff to write an "After Action Report" on coordination meetings
  - -Create promotion and reward mechanisms that recognise the value of civil-military-police coordination
- Involve diverse types of civilians in the planning and design of civil-military-police joint training and joint exercises to address stereotypes, learn terminology, meet people who will be in a shared operational environment, and learn about each other's organisational culture, goals, etc.
- Military forces should receive guidance on how to communicate with civilian organisations and civilians without endangering their safety or access to beneficiaries and the need for talking to other components of the mission or civilian actors outside the mission.

<u>During a Crisis</u>
- Identify other organisations working in the same environment by mapping all stakeholders, especially local civil society organisations
- Identify existing coordination structures and find points of contact, including phone numbers and emails to initiate communication.
- Military, police and civilian organisations should have a basic understanding of their own and the other's roles and responsibilities in the current conflict environment and be able to identify liaison points to contact each other.
- CSOs should identify appropriate and complementary roles for the military.

REVIEW

This lesson identifies different approaches to coordination. Civilians, military and police share some characteristics but also are distinct in important ways. This lesson identifies the reasons why coordination is essential when different stakeholders are working in the same complex environment on similar tasks to support human security.

Citations

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[34] Cedric De Coning and Karsten Friis, "Coherence and Coordination: The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach," *Journal of International Peacekeeping.* Volume 15. (2011): 257-259.

[35] This section is adapted from the *UN Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies*, (New York: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2008), 24.

[36] De Coning and Friis, 254.

[37] De Coning and Friis, 254

[38] UN Civil Military Coordination (UN CMCOORD). See: http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/UN-CMCoord/overview accessed October 2015.

[39] Cedric De Coning, "Clarity, Coherence, and Context: Three Priorities for Sustainable Peacebuilding," (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2010), 26.

Lesson 9   Learning Exercises

Anchor   *10 minutes*

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or three people their response to these questions:

- Have you ever coordinated with someone from another organisation to respond to a crisis?
- What was the most difficult part of coordinating?
- What was the most successful benefit of coordinating?

Add   *20 minutes*

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply   *25 minutes*

The goal of this exercise is to identify challenges and opportunities for coordinating with other stakeholders in a complex environment. In each of the scenarios, one of the international aid groups that has stayed after the earthquake is targeted by one of the militia groups. The military group kills three of their female local staff and their compound in an urban area receives a bomb threat. The militia group announces on the radio that they will keep targeting any aid group that works with the government. Each group has thirty minutes to develop an initial response to this news and to negotiate with other stakeholders to develop a coordination plan. Groups may continue to discuss internally their own plan, or work with other stakeholders to reach a joint plan. Then, each stakeholder team or group of teams is allowed two minutes to outline their plan and/or to oppose the plans of other groups. Debrief with open questions about the challenges and trade-offs in this role-play.

See the "Scenario-based Learning" section in the [Handbook on Human Security: A Civil-Military-Police Curriculum](#) for explanation of the scenarios and teams.

Away   *5 minutes*

In a large group, participants can discuss this question:

What will I take away from this lesson on the security sector that might impact the way I do my work in the future?